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Abstract
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items
over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immediately
and irrevocably, to one of n agents. Agent i assigns a value vit ∈ [0, 1] to the t-th item to arrive
and has an additive valuation function. If the values are chosen by an adaptive adversary, that
gets to see the (random) allocations of items 1 through t−1 before choosing vit, it is known that
the algorithm that minimizes maximum pairwise envy simply allocates each item uniformly at
random; the maximum pairwise envy is then sublinear in T , namely O˜(
√
T/n). If the values
are independently and identically drawn from an adversarially chosen distribution D, it is also
known that, under some mild conditions on D, allocating to the agent with the highest value
— a Pareto efficient allocation — is envy-free with high probability.
In this paper we study fairness-efficiency tradeoffs in this setting and provide matching
upper and lower bounds under a spectrum of progressively stronger adversaries. On one hand
we show that, even against a non-adaptive adversary, there is no algorithm with sublinear
maximum pairwise envy that Pareto dominates the simple algorithm that allocates each item
uniformly at random. On the other hand, under a slightly weaker adversary regime where item
values are drawn from a known distribution and are independent with respect to time, i.e. vit is
independent of v
itˆ
but possibly correlated with v
iˆt
, optimal (in isolation) efficiency is compatible
with optimal (in isolation) fairness. That is, we give an algorithm that is Pareto efficient ex-
post and is simultaneously optimal with respect to fairness: for each pair of agents i and j,
either i envies j by at most one item (a prominent fairness notion), or i does not envy j with
high probability. En route, we prove a structural (and constructive) result about allocations
of divisible items that might be of independent interest: there always exists a Pareto efficient
divisible allocation where each agent i either strictly prefers her own bundle to the bundle of
agent j, or, if she is indifferent, then i and j have identical allocations and the same value (up
to multiplicative factors) for all the items that are allocated to them.
1 Introduction
A set of T indivisible goods has to be allocated to a set of n agents with additive utilities, in a
way that is fair and efficient. A standard fairness concept is envy-freeness, which requires that
each agent prefers her own allocation over the allocation of any other agent. Even though envy
is clearly unavoidable in this context — consider the case of a single indivisible good and two
agents — providing approximately envy-free solutions is possible [7, 22]. Specifically, an allocation
is envy-free up to one item (EF1) if for every pair of agents i and j, any envy i has for j can be
eliminated by removing at most one good from j’s bundle. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [7] show
that the allocation that maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities (with ties broken based on
the number of agents with positive utility) is EF1 and Pareto efficient.
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The majority of the literature to date has focused on the case where the items are available to
the algorithm upfront. In many situations of interest, however, items arrive online. A paradigmatic
example is that of food banks [1, 20]. Food banks across the world receive food donations they
must allocate; these donations are often perishable, and thus allocation decisions must be made
quickly, and donations are typically leftovers, leading to uncertainty about items that will arrive in
the future. Benade` et al. [5] study this problem, but focus only on fairness. They show that there
exists a deterministic algorithm with vanishing envy, that is, the maximum pairwise envy (after all
T items have been allocated) is sublinear in T , when the value vit of agent i for the t-th item is
normalized to be in [0, 1]. Specifically, the envy is guaranteed to be at most O(
√
T log T/n), and
this guarantee is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. The same guarantee can be also achieved by
the simple randomized algorithm that allocates each item to a uniformly at random chosen agent.
These results hold even against an adaptive adversary that selects the value vit after seeing the
allocation of the first t − 1 items. On the other hand, if we focus only on efficiency, our task is
much easier. For example, we could simply allocate each item to the agent with the highest value.
But, and this brings us to our interest here, the question remains: How should we make allocation
decisions online in a way that is fair to the donation recipients, but also as efficient as possible?
1.1 Our Contributions
We study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the following setting. T indivisible items
arrive online; item t has value vit for agent i and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably.
We investigate this tradeoff under a range of adversary models, each one specifying how the values
vit are generated. We consider five adversaries and completely characterize the extent to which
fairness and efficiency are compatible under each and every one of them.
The weakest adversary we consider simply selects a distribution D from which each value vit is
drawn (independently and identically). For this case, even though the setting studied was otherwise
unrelated, the answer is essentially given by Dickerson et al. [11] (and later simplified and improved
by Kurokawa et al. [19]): under conditions on D, the algorithm that allocates each item to the agent
with the highest value, an ex-post Pareto efficient algorithm1, is envy-free with high probability.
Removing the conditions on D is possible: we prove (Proposition 3.1) that a simple variation of this
algorithm (that remains ex-post Pareto efficient) either outputs an EF1 allocation, or is envy-free
with high probability as the number of items goes to infinity.
Our next, slightly stronger adversary selects a distribution Di for each agent i; agents are
independent, but not identical, and items are independent and identical. Unfortunately, as we
discuss in Section 3, it seems very unlikely that the previous greedy approach generalizes even to
this adversary. Our first main result is an optimal algorithm that works against the even stronger
adversary that allows for correlated agents, but i.i.d. items: vit can be correlated with viˆt but not
with vitˆ. In Theorem 3.6 we give an ex-post Pareto efficient algorithm that guarantees to every pair
of agents i, j that i envies j by at most one item ex-post, or i will not envy j with high probability.
On a high level our approach works as follows. We take the support of the correlated distribution
chosen by the adversary2, scale each item down by the probability it is drawn, and treat this as an
offline instance (with n agents and as many items as the support of the joint distribution D). We
first prove (Lemma 3.3) that using a fractional Pareto efficient solution to guide the online decisions
(that is, if an x fraction of item j is allocated to agent i in the offline problem, she gets the item with
probability x every time it appears) results in ex-post Pareto efficient allocations; in fact, applying
almost any scaling (or no scaling) doesn’t change this. By coupling this with a Pareto efficient
1See Section 2 for definitions.
2We assume finite support; see Section 2.
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and envy-free offline solution, say the fractional allocation that maximizes the product of agents’
utilities, we can get an ex-post Pareto efficient algorithm with O˜(
√
T ) envy, since we can treat the
pairwise envy between agents i and j contributed by item t as a zero mean random variable with
support in [−1, 1] (since the vits are in [0, 1]) and use standard concentration inequalities. If instead
the allocation was strongly envy-free, i.e. each agent strictly preferred her own allocation, then
these random variables would have negative mean, and the same concentration inequalities would
imply negative envy, i.e. envy-freeness, with high probability. This goal is, unfortunately, a bit too
optimistic. But, surprisingly, we can provide an allocation with a property (slightly) weaker than
strong envy-freeness, which enables, in the online setting, envy-freeness with high probability or
EF1 ex-post (the same guarantee as against the weakest adversary!).
Our second main result (Theorem 4.1) is a structural, and constructive, result about fractional
allocations in the offline problem. We give an algorithm that finds a Pareto efficient fractional
allocation where agent i either strictly prefers her allocation to the allocation of agent j, or, if
she is indifferent, then i and j have identical allocations and the same value (up to multiplicative
factors) for all items allocated to them. We do this by giving budgets e and a solution (x,p)
to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program where x has the desired fairness properties. In slightly
more detail, we start with the E-G solution where all agents have the same budget, and leverage
various properties implied by the KKT conditions in order to iteratively adjust the initial solution
and budgets. Our goal is to eliminate edges in the “indifference graph”, a graph where vertices
correspond to agents and there exists a directed edge from i to j if agent i is indifferent between
her allocation and the allocation of agent j. We end up with an indifference graph that is a disjoint
union of cliques, where agents in the same clique have the same allocation and the same value
for the items allocated to them (up to multiplicative factors). At this point, the reader familiar
with the E-G convex program might be wondering if budget adjustments are even needed. In
Appendix A we provide an example where in order to get the desired structure, giving a different
budget to each agent is necessary. We believe that our result is of independent interest, and our
approach might have further applications.
Before we proceed to even stronger adversaries, we briefly discuss the chosen fairness criteria.
Our results focus on the extent to which efficiency is achievable under the restriction that the
algorithm must also guarantee the same fairness criteria that can be achieved in isolation. The
fairness guarantee of our main positive result consists of a probabilistic and non-probabilistic part.
Even in isolation and under the weakest adversary, this is the best fairness guarantee (with respect
to envy) that can be achieved, as we cannot improve on the probabilistic or non-probabilistic
guarantee. That is, it is impossible to always output an EF1 allocation (ex-post), and it is also
impossible to always output an allocation that is envy-free with high probability. One might
further ask if we can give a single non-probabilistic guarantee, but, even envy-freeness up to a
constant is not achievable in the online setting; see Appendix B for these impossibility results. Our
algorithms do guarantee vanishing envy, but, while not directly comparable to the “EF1 or EF
w.h.p.” guarantee, qualitatively this guarantee seems much weaker. Finally, one might attempt to
restrict the class of distributions considered. In Appendix F we show that if one excludes point
masses, it is possible to guarantee EF with high probability (that is, improve the “or EF1” part)
for the case of independent agents and i.i.d. items. We do not know if the same result is possible
for the case of correlated agents.
Our next (and stronger) adversary is a familiar one: a non-adaptive adversary that selects
an instance (with T items) after seeing the algorithm’s “code”, but without knowing the random
outcomes of coins used by the algorithm. Of course, as in all the previous cases, the result of Benade`
et al. [5] still applies, so O˜(
√
T/n) envy is still possible via a deterministic algorithm, but also by
simply allocating each item uniformly at random. Our third main result (Theorem 5.1) shows that
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the latter algorithm is essentially optimal in terms of Pareto efficiency among all algorithms with
sublinear envy! Specifically, we show that for every ε > 0, there is no algorithm with sublinear
envy that achieves (1/n+ ε)-Pareto efficiency ex-ante; see Section 2 for definitions, but, intuitively
an allocation is α-Pareto efficient, for α ∈ (0, 1], if it is not possible to improve all agents’ utilities
by a factor of 1/α. This result extends to our last adversary, the fully adaptive one.
See Table 1 for a summary of our results.
Setting Lower Bound Upper Bound
Identical Agents
i.i.d. items
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) impossible
to improve (Appendix B)
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) and ex-post PO
(Prop. 3.1, essentially [11])
Independent Agents
i.i.d. items
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) impossible
to improve
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) and ex-post PO
Correlated Agents
i.i.d. items
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) impossible
to improve
(EF1 or EF w.h.p.) and ex-post PO
(Theorem 3.6)
Non-Adaptive
Vanishing envy and ex-ante 1/n + ε
Pareto is impossible (Theorem 5.1)
Vanishing envy and
ex-ante 1/n Pareto
Adaptive Vanishing envy and ex-ante 1/n + ε
Pareto is impossible
Vanishing envy and
ex-ante 1/n Pareto [5]
Table 1: Comparing the compatibility of efficiency and envy in each setting.
1.2 Related Work and Roadmap
Our paper is related to the growing literature on online or dynamic fair division ([5, 17, 18, 13,
14, 21, 12, 1, 27, 6]). The work most closely related to ours is by Benade` et al. [5]. They study
envy-freeness in isolation against a fully adaptive adversary, and design a deterministic algorithm
(specifically a derandomization of the simple algorithm that allocates each item uniformly at ran-
dom) that achieves maximum envy of O˜(
√
T/n). They also show that this is tight up to poly-
logarithmic factors. In contrast, here we study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency under
different adversaries; against the fully adaptive adversary we prove that there is no algorithm with
sublinear (in T ) envy that outperforms allocating uniformly at random in terms of efficiency. In
the same setting, He et al. [17] study the number of adjustments that are necessary and sufficient
in order to maintain an EF1 allocation online. Very recently, Bansal et al. [2] give an algorithm
that guarantees envy at most O(log T ) with high probability (efficiency is not considered), for the
case of two i.i.d. agents. Notably, as opposed to our positive result here, their result allows for
the adversary’s distribution to depend on T . Even though the setting studied is completely differ-
ent, the proof that allocating to the agent with the highest value is optimal against the weakest
adversary (identical agents and i.i.d. items) is given by Dickerson et al. [11] (a similar statement
also appears in Kurokawa et al. [19]), where it is shown that this algorithm outputs an envy-free
allocation with probability that goes to 1 as the number of items goes to infinity; we go over their
result in more detail, as well as argue about why it seems unlikely that it generalizes to stronger
adversaries, in Section 3.
For the offline problem, i.e. when all item values are available to the algorithm, Caragiannis
et al. [7] show that there is no tradeoff between fairness and efficiency. The (integral) allocation that
maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities is Pareto efficient and EF1, simultaneously. More
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recently, Barman et al. [4] show that there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally
Pareto efficient (and also give pseudopolynomial time algorithm for finding allocations that are EF1
and Pareto efficient). Computing the fractional allocation that maximizes the product of utilities
is a special case of the Fisher market equilibrium with affine utility buyers; the latter problem was
solved in (weakly) polynomial time by Devanur et al. [10], improved to a strongly polynomial time
algorithm by Orlin [24]. Our structural result starts from an exact solution to the Eisenberg-Gale
convex program and then uses a polynomial number of operations. Therefore, all our algorithms
run in strongly polynomial time; we further comment on this in Section 6.
It is worth pointing out a connection between what we call the indifference graph and the so-
called maximum bang per buck (MBB) graph. In our indifference graph there is an edge from i to
j if i is indifferent between her allocation and the allocation of agent j. We show (Lemma 4.3) that
this condition is equivalent to vik/pk = vi(Ai)/ei, for all items k that j gets a non-zero fraction of,
where pk is the price of item k and ei is the budget of agent i. On the other hand, the MBB graph
is bipartite, one side is agents and the other is items, and there is an edge from agent i to item k if
vik/pk = vi(Ai)/ei. Properties of MBB graphs have been crucial in recent algorithmic progress on
approximating the Nash Social Welfare, e.g. Cole and Gkatzelis [9], Garg et al. [16], Chaudhury
et al. [8], as well as in computing equilibria in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets (Garg and Ve´gh
[15]), but beyond the similarity in the definition we are unaware of any technical overlap.
Roadmap. Section 2 poses our model and some preliminaries. In Section 3 we prove our main
positive result: for all i.i.d. distributions over items (with possibly correlated agents), there exists
an algorithm that always outputs a Pareto efficient allocation (i.e. this is an ex-post Pareto efficient
algorithm) that guarantees that for each pair of agents i and j, either i envies j by at most one
item, or i does not envy j with high probability. As we mentioned earlier, our algorithm relies on a
structural result about divisible allocations; we prove this result in Section 4. In Section 5 we prove
our main negative result: there is a non-adaptive adversary strategy, such that no vanishing envy
algorithm has efficiency better than allocating uniformly at random. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We study the problem of allocating a set of T indivisible items (also referred to as goods) arriving
over time, labeled by G = {1, 2, · · · , T}, to a set of n agents, labeled by N = {1, . . . , n}. Agent
i ∈ N assigns a (normalized) value vit ∈ [0, 1] to each item t ∈ G. Agents have additive utilities for
subsets of items: the value of agent i for a subset of the items S is vi(S) =
∑
t∈S vit. An allocation
A is a partition of the items into bundles A1, . . . , An, where Ai is assigned to agent i ∈ N .
Items arrive in order, one per round, for a total of T rounds. The agents’ valuations for the t-th
item become available only after the item arrives, and are unknown until then. Let Gt = {1, 2, . . . , t}
be the set of items that have arrived up until time t. We denote an allocation of Gt by At. We
would like to allocate the goods to the agents in a way that the final allocation AT is fair and
efficient. Before we formally define our notions of fairness and efficiency, we go over the different
adversary models, each one specifying how the agents’ item values are generated.
Adversary Models. One can think of each scenario as a game between the adversary and the
algorithm. For the first three adversaries it will be more intuitive to think of the adversary picking
her strategy first, followed by the algorithm, that gets to first see the adversary’s strategy. For the
last two, it will be more intuitive to think of the algorithm’s code being fixed before the adversary
picks her strategy. We list our adversaries from weakest to strongest, where a stronger adversary
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can simulate the strategy of a weaker adversary but not vice versa. All distributions are assumed
to be discrete with finite support. (1) Identical agents and i.i.d. items. The adversary selects
a distribution D. On round t, the value of item t to each agent i is drawn independently from
this distribution, i.e. vit ∼ D. (2) Independent agents and i.i.d. items. The adversary
selects a distribution Di for each agent i. On round t, the value of item t to each agent i is drawn
independently from their value distribution, that is vit ∼ Di. (3) Correlated agents and i.i.d.
items. The adversary specifies a joint distribution D with marginals D1, . . . ,Dn. On round t,
the vector of values vt = (v1t, . . . , vnt) is drawn i.i.d. from D. That is, vit can be correlated with
vjt, but not with vitˆ. For simplicity, we treat this setting as follows. Each item t has one of m
types. Agent i has value vi(γj) for an item of type γj ; the type of each item is drawn i.i.d. from
a distribution D with support GD, |GD| = m. We write fD(γj) for the probability that the t-th
item has type γj . Our main positive result is for this setting. (4) Non-adaptive adversary. The
adversary selects an instance (with n agents and T items) after seeing the algorithm’s code, but
doesn’t know the outcomes of the random coins flipped by the algorithm. Our main negative result
is for this setting. (5) Adaptive Adversary When the adversary selects the value vit she has
access to the algorithm’s decisions for the first t − 1 items. This is the setting studied in Benade`
et al. [5].
Known vs Unknown T . A subtle point that needs to be addressed is whether T is fixed or not
when the adversary picks her strategy. For the latter two adversaries we assume that T is fixed
(the results of [5] also need this assumption). For the first three adversaries it will be convenient to
think of the adversary picking a distribution and then study our algorithm’s behavior as T goes to
infinity. That is, the distribution picked by the adversary does not depend on T ; so, it cannot for
example have support of size T or variance 1/T , and so on. This allows us to bypass common issues
regarding the dependence on the number of items and existence of fair allocations in probabilistic
settings (e.g. the answer could depend on whether T is divisible by n); see [11, 19, 23] for some
examples where this dependence is crucial. It is worth noting that the recent result of Bansal et al.
[2] for the case of two correlated agents allows the agents’ distribution to depend on T (but only
gets an O(log T ) bound on envy, with high probability, and no guarantees about efficiency).
Fairness and Efficiency. The utility profile of an allocation A is a vector u = (u1, . . . , un) where
ui = vi(Ai). A utility vector u dominates another utility vector u
′, denoted by u ≻ u′, if for all
i ∈ N , ui ≥ u′i and for some j ∈ N , uj > u′j. An allocation that achieves utility u is Pareto efficient
if there is no allocation with utility vector u′ such that u′ ≻ u. Uncertainty about the future when
making allocation decisions will make it impossible to provide efficiency and fairness guarantees
simultaneously. In order to measure the efficiency of our algorithms we instead use the following
notion of approximate Pareto efficiency, initially defined by Ruhe and Fruhwirth [25]: an allocation
with utility profile u is α-Pareto efficient, if there is no feasible utility profile in which, compared
to u, every agent is (strictly) more than 1/α times better off.
Since our setting is online, we also need to further specify whether our guarantees are worst-case
or average-case with respect to the adversary instance and the randomness of our algorithms. For a
worst-case guarantee, we say that an allocation is α-Pareto efficient ex-post if it always outputs an
α-Pareto efficient allocation (that is, for all agent valuations and all possible outcomes of the random
coins flipped by the algorithm). On the other hand, an allocation algorithm is α-Pareto efficient
ex-ante if the expected allocation is α-Pareto efficient (where the expectation is with respect to the
randomness in the instance and the algorithm). Our main positive result/algorithm will guarantee
1-Pareto efficiency ex-post, while our main negative result shows that a certain notion of fairness
is incompatible with 1/n-Pareto efficiency ex-ante.
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Regarding fairness, in this paper we focus on envy. Given an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An),
let ENVYi,j(A) = max{vi(Aj) − vi(Ai), 0} be the pairwise envy between agents i and j, and let
ENVY(A) = maxi,j∈N ENVYi,j(A) be the maximum envy. Clearly, if ENVY(A) = 0 the allocation
is envy-free. An allocation A is EF1, if for all pairs of agents i, j ENVYi,j(A) ≤ maxt∈Aj vit. Note
that this is a stronger guarantee than ENVY(A) ≤ 1, since the highest value an agent has can be
less than 1. An algorithm has vanishing envy if the expected maximum pairwise envy is sublinear
in T , that is E[ENVY(A)] ∈ o(T ), or just limT→∞E[ENVY(A)]/T → 0.
3 When Fairness and Efficiency are Compatible
In this section we go over the first three, weaker adversaries, under which fairness and efficiency
are compatible. We start with the easiest setting, identical agents with i.i.d. items, in Section 3.1.
We then proceed, in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, to our main positive result, an algorithm for correlated
agents with i.i.d. items that gives the optimal fairness and efficiency guarantees. This, of course,
implies the same result for independent agents with i.i.d. items. In Section 3.2 we highlight some
key insights, while avoiding some of the technical obstacles, and give an ex-post Pareto efficient
algorithm with a slightly weaker fairness guarantee. We give our main algorithm in Section 3.3.
3.1 Identical Agents with i.i.d. Items
Consider an adversary that picks a single distribution D, with support GD of size m, and vit
is sampled i.i.d. from D, for all agents i and all items t. Then, efficiency and fairness can be
simultaneously achieved using the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Utilitarian
if D is a point mass then
Allocate each arriving item in a round-robin manner.
else
For each arriving item t, allocate it to the agent i with the maximum value vit, breaking ties
uniformly at random.
end
Proposition 3.1. Algorithm 1 outputs an allocation that is always Pareto efficient. Furthermore,
for all ε > 0, there exists T0 = T0(ε), such that if T ≥ T0, the output allocation satisfies EF1 or is
envy-free with probability at least 1− ε.
This result is essentially given by Dickerson et al. [11], in a different context. Dickerson et al.
[11] show that in a static setting with K items and n agents, where the value of agent i for item
t is drawn from a distribution Di, then under mild conditions on the distributions, an envy-free
allocation exists with probability 1 as K goes to infinity.
Theorem 3.2 (Dickerson et al. [11]). Assume that for all i, j ∈ N and items t the input dis-
tributions satisfy (1) Pr[argmaxk∈N vkt = {i}] = 1/n, and (2) there exist constants µ, µ∗ such
that
0 < E[vit| argmax
k∈N
vkt = {j}] ≤ µ < µ∗ ≤ E[vit| argmax
k∈N
vkt = {i}].
Then for all n ∈ O(K/ logK), allocating each item to the agent with the highest value is envy-free
with probability 1 as K →∞.
7
The first condition implies that each player receives roughly 1/n of the goods, and the second
condition ensures that each player has higher expected value for each of his own goods compared to
goods allocated to other players. Given this result, it is straightforward to prove Proposition 3.1.
The proof is relegated to Appendix C.1.
3.2 Warm-up: Pareto Optimal Rounding
One might ask if we can keep the simplicity of Algorithm 1 and extend it to work with a stronger ad-
versary, such as when agent’s valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed.
Note that in this case, asking for the probability that agent i has the highest value to be 1/n is a
fairly strong requirement, so the result of [11] no longer applies. One possible approach is to assign
item t to the agent i for whom FDi(vit) is highest, where FDi is the quantile function for agent
i’s value distribution. In fact, this approach is fruitful if one focuses solely on fairness, as shown
by Kurokawa et al. [19]. However, the resulting allocation is not guaranteed to be Pareto efficient.
For example, consider a simple scenario with 2 agents: the first agent has values distributed uni-
formly in [0, 1], and the second agent has values uniformly distributed in [1/2− ε, 1/2+ ε] for some
small ε. The second agent cares mostly about the number of items she got; items with high quan-
tiles and low quantiles have essentially the same value for her. Therefore, intuitively, exchanging
items that agent 2 won but have large values for agent 1 (i.e. items where both had high quantiles
and 2 ended up larger) for items that agent 1 won with low valuation (i.e. items where both had
low quantile and 1 ended up larger) will result in a Pareto improvement.3
All in all, achieving fairness and efficiency simultaneously, beyond identical agents, seems a
lot more intricate than fairness or efficiency in isolation. We will skip the independent agent case
altogether, and directly study the harder problem of correlated agents: each item t draws its type
γj from a distribution D. Items are i.i.d. but agent values can be correlated. Before we present the
optimal algorithm we illustrate some key ideas by giving a simple algorithm that achieves ex-post
Pareto efficiency and a weaker notion of fairness, namely vanishing envy with high probability.
Recall that fD(γj) is the probability that an item drawn from D has type γj, and GD, with
|GD| = m, is the support of D. vi(γj) is the value of an item of type γj to agent i; note that this
is different than vit, the value of agent i for the t-th item to arrive.
Although the original problem concerns indivisible items, our approach solves an offline divisible
item allocation problem as an intermediate step. Rather than each item being assigned to an agent,
a fractional allocation is an n by m matrix X, where n is the number of agents andm is the support
of D. For each agent i and item j, Xij ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of item j allocated to agent
i. X is constrained so that
∑
i∈N Xij = 1 for all items j. The i
th row of X, Xi, can be thought of
as the fractional allocation of agent i. Finally, we assume agents have linear preferences, where for
any two agents i, j, vi(Xj) =
∑
k∈[m] vikXjk.
We first show that Algorithm 2 always produces a Pareto optimal allocation. In fact, we show
something much stronger: allocating type γj to agent i with probability Xij always results in a
Pareto efficient allocation (ex-post) for every Pareto efficient fractional allocation X.
Lemma 3.3. Given a distribution D over m item types and valuation function vi for each agent
i, let X be a fractional and Pareto optimal allocation of GD under valuation functions v
′
i, where
v′i(γj) = vi(γj) · fD(γj). Let S be a set of T items, where the type of the t-th item is drawn from
D. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be any allocation of S where an item with type γj is allocated to agent i
only if Xij > 0. Then A is Pareto optimal under v.
3For a specific instance, consider the allocation for the following three items: (0.9, 1
2
+ ε), (0.1, 1
2
− ε), (0.1, 1
2
− ε).
The second agent receives the first item, while the first agent receives the latter two, which is not Pareto optimal.
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Algorithm 2: Pareto Optimal Rounding
Input: Distribution D over item types, agent valuation functions vi.
1. Define v′i for each agent i as follows. For each γj ∈ GD, set v′i(γj) = vi(γj)fD(γj).
2. Find the divisible allocation X of GD that maximizes the product of utilities w.r.t v
′.
3. In the online setting, allocate the newly arrived item t with type γj to agent i with
probability Xij , for all t = 1 . . . T .
Proof. We prove the theorem in two steps. First, we show that X is also Pareto optimal under v.
Second, we show that if X is Pareto optimal under v, then A will be Pareto optimal under v.
First, suppose that X is not Pareto optimal under v. Let X ′ be an allocation that dominates
X under v and let ∆ = X ′ − X. We construct ∆′, where ∆′ij = ∆ij · 1fD(γj) , so that the change
in utilities induced by ∆′ under v′ is the same as the change in utilities induced by ∆ under v.
Therefore, the (possibly infeasible) allocation X + ∆′ dominates X under v′. However, for all
c ∈ [0, 1], allocation X + c∆ is feasible and still dominates X under v. Setting c = mink fD(γk),
X + c∆′ is a feasible allocation that Pareto dominates X under v′, which contradicts the Pareto
optimality of X under v′.
Next, let A be the set of all allocations A (of T items) such that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S an
item with type γj is allocated to agent i only if Xij > 0. We can write X as
∑
A∈A pA · A, such
that pA > 0 for all A, and
∑
A∈A pA = 1. This can be done by simply giving each item j ∈ S
to agent i with probability Xij . It is easy to confirm that the set of all possible allocations that
can be outputs by this procedure is precisely A, and the probability that a specific allocation A is
generated is exactly pA =
∏
j∈S
∏
i∈N Xij · 1{i gets item j in A}. Finally, since X =
∑
A∈A pA ·A,
if an allocation Aˆ ∈ A is Pareto dominated by an allocation Aˆ′ under v, by replacing the pAˆAˆ
term by a pAˆAˆ
′ term we get a fractional allocation X ′ that dominates X, contradicting the Pareto
optimality of X under v.
Maximizing the product of utilities leads to a Pareto efficient divisible item allocation. There-
fore, Lemma 3.3 implies that Algorithm 2 is ex-post Pareto efficient. Algorithm 2 guarantees a
notion of fairness slightly weaker than vanishing envy: vanishing envy with high probability.
Theorem 3.4. For all ε > 0, there exists T0 = T0(ε), such that if T ≥ T0, Algorithm 2 outputs an
allocation A such that for all agents i, j, ENVYi,j(A) ∈ o(T ) with probability at least 1− ε.
Proof. The divisible allocation X that maximizes the product of utilities is envy-free [26]. Thus,
we have
∑
k∈[m] vi(γk)fD(γk)Xik ≥
∑
k∈[m] vi(γk)fD(γk)Xjk for all pairs of agents i, j. The value of
agent i for the bundle allocated to agent j by Algorithm 2, vi(Aj), is a random variable depending
on randomness in both the algorithm and item draws. Let Ik,jt be an indicator random variable for
the event that item t is of type γk and is assigned to agent j. We have for any pair of agents i, j:
vi(Aj) =
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
k∈[m] vi(γk)I
k,j
t . Therefore, E[vi(Aj)] = T ·
∑
k∈[m] vi(γk)fD(γk)Xjk. From the
previous discussion, we then have that E[vi(Ai)] ≥ E[vi(Aj)]. Using Hoeffding’s inequality with
parameter δ =
√
T log T we get: Pr[vi(Ai) − E[vi(Ai)]] ≤ −
√
T log T ] ≤ 2 exp
(
−2T logTT
)
= 2
T 2
,
and similarly for the deviation of vi(Aj). We conclude that by picking T0 =
√
4/ε, then with
probability at least 1− 4T 2 ≥ 1− ε, ENVYi,j(A) = max{vi(Aj)− vi(Ai), 0} ≤ 2
√
T log T ∈ o(T ).
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3.3 Beyond Vanishing Envy: Optimal Fairness for Correlated Agents
In the proof of Theorem 3.4 we use standard tail inequalities to show that, with high probability,
the envy between any two agents does not deviate from its expectation by more than O(
√
T log T ).
Since the divisible allocation we are using to round guarantees envy-freeness, this leads to vanishing
envy. If instead we were able to find an allocation X for the divisible item problem that guarantees
strong envy-freeness, where for every pair of agents i, j, vi(Xi) > vi(Xj), and used X to guide
the online decisions, by a similar calculation the final allocation would be envy-free with high
probability, since E[vi(Ai)]−E[vi(Aj)] decreases much faster than the deviation bound of
√
T log T .
Unfortunately, strong envy-free allocations do not always exist, even for divisible items; consider
the case of two agents with identical valuations. Interestingly, in isolation this condition is also
sufficient: if no two players have identical valuation functions (up to multiplicative factor), there
exists a strongly envy-free allocation; see Barbanel [3]. However, if we want both Pareto optimality
and strong envy-freeness, the condition is no longer sufficient; see Appendix D for an example4.
Nevertheless, we can still achieve a notion of fairness that is weaker than strong envy-freeness,
but still sufficient for our purposes. We say that agent i is indifferent to agent j if vi(Xi) = vi(Xj).
We then view indifference as a directed graph, where the nodes consist of the n agents and there
is an edge from i to j if i is indifferent to j. For a divisible item allocation X, let I(X) refer to the
indifference graph. Note that for an envy-free allocation X, lack of an edge from node i to node j
in I(X) implies that vi(Xi) > vi(Xj), i.e. strong envy-freeness between the two agents.
Definition 3.5. A divisible allocation X is clique identical strongly envy-free (CISEF) if X is
envy-free and there exists a partition of agents N into s sets C1, . . . , Cs such that: (1) For each
i ∈ [s], Ci is a clique in I(X), (2) for each i, j ∈ [s] where i 6= j, there are no edges between Ci and
Cj, (3) for each i ∈ [s], for each pair of agents j, k ∈ Ci, Xj = Xk, and (4) there exists positive
scalars r1, . . . , rn such that for each i ∈ [s], pair of agents j, k ∈ Ci and item l where Xjl > 0 (or
Xkl > 0),
vjl
rj
= vklrk .
In other words, an allocation is CISEF if X is envy-free, the graph I(X) is a disjoint union of
cliques, agents in a clique have identical allocations, and agents have identical valuations (up to a
multiplicative factor) over items allocated to any agent in the clique.
The intuition behind this definition is the following. As discussed in Appendix D, it is impossible
to find a strongly envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation in situations where some agents have
valuations that are identical for the items that they could receive in a Pareto optimal allocation.
In the definition of CISEF, these too similar agents will be given identical allocations and end up
in the same clique. However, in all other cases, the allocation is strongly envy-free.
In Theorem 4.2 in Section 4 we prove our main structural result. We will show that for any
divisible item problem instance, we can find an allocation X∗ that is both Pareto efficient and
CISEF. In the remainder of this section we present a slightly modified version of Algorithm 2 that,
given such a Pareto efficient and CISEF divisible allocation, remains Pareto efficient ex-post and
also achieves the target fairness properties.
4Barbanel [3] gives a sufficient condition for Pareto optimality and strong envy-freeness to be simultaneously
achievable. Unfortunately, this condition cannot be satisfied here: it roughly asks for every pair of agents to have a
different value for every subset (allowing for fractional items) of items. See Theorem 12.36 in Barbanel [3] for the
exact statement and proof.
5i thinks that argminj∈Nvi(A
t
j) has the smallest value so far. We select the agent with the smallest value according
to all i ∈ N , which is unique, up to tie breaking, since all agents agree on the value of all items that have gone to
the clique (up to multiplicative factors).
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Algorithm 3: Pareto Optimal Clique Rounding
Input: Item distribution D, agent valuation functions vi.
1. Define v′i for each agent i as follows. For each γj ∈ GD, set v′i(γj) = vi(γj)fD(γj).
2. Compute a divisible allocation X∗ of GD under valuation functions v
′
i that is both Pareto
efficient and CISEF (see Section 4 for an algorithm). Let C1, · · · , Cs be the disjoint cliques
of the graph.
3. In the online setting, assign the newly arrived item t with type γj to clique Ci with
probability
∑
k∈Ci
X∗kj. After an item is assigned to a clique Ci, allocate it among the
agents in Ci by giving it to the agent in Ci who has received the least value so far, according
to all agents in the clique.5
Theorem 3.6. Algorithm 3 is ex-post Pareto efficient and, for all ε > 0, there exists T0 = T0(ε),
such that if T ≥ T0, for all agents i, j, one of the two guarantees holds: either i envies j by at most
one item with probability 1 or i will not envy j with probability at least 1− ε.
Proof. Let A be the allocation produced by Algorithm 3 and X∗ be the fractional allocation found
for the divisible item allocation problem. Pareto efficiency is immediately implied by Lemma 3.3,
since X∗ is Pareto efficient and an item of type γj is allocated to agent i only if X
∗
ij > 0.
For any two agents i, j, there are two cases. In the first case, i and j belong to the same clique
Ck. Let S be the set of items assigned to Ck during the execution of Algorithm 3, i.e. S = ∪ℓ∈CkAℓ.
Agents in Ck have identical valuations up to a multiplicative factor for the items that they get with
positive probability. Therefore, giving each item to the agent that has received the least value so far
(according to any agent, as they rank allocations of S in the same order) ensures that ENVYi,j(A)
is at most the maximum value that i has for any item in S.
Now consider the case that i and j belong to different cliques, Ci and Cj respectively. By the
definition of a CISEF allocation, we know that vi(X
∗
i ) = vi(X
∗
j ) + c for some constant c > 0. Let
A˜i be the fractional allocation where agent i receives a 1/|Ci| fraction of the items assigned to her
clique, i.e. A˜it =
1
|Ci|
1{t ∈ Ak for some agent k ∈ Ci}, and similarly for A˜j . Since agents in a clique
receive identical allocations in A we have that E[vi(A˜i)− vi(A˜j)] = T E[vi(X∗i )− vi(X∗j )] = cT .
We can apply Hoeffding’s inequality to show that with probability at least 1−Θ(1/T 2) ≥ 1−ε,
vi(A˜j) − vi(A˜i) < 2
√
T log T − cT , which is negative for sufficiently large T . Specifically, we can
pick T large enough so that vi(A˜j) − vi(A˜i) < −2 with high probability. Finally, observe that
|vi(Ai) − vi(A˜i)| ≤ 1. This is because A˜i is the average allocation of agents in the clique, and,
as we argued earlier, the maximum envy for two agents in the same clique is at most 1, thus
vi(Aj) − vi(Ai) < vi(A˜j) − vi(A˜i) + 2. Combined with the deviation bound, we conclude that
vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) ≤ 0 with probability at least 1− ε.
4 Achieving Pareto Efficiency and CISEF
In this section we prove our main structural result.
Theorem 4.1. Given any instance with m divisible items and n additive agents, there always exists
an allocation that is simultaneously clique identical strongly envy-free (CISEF) and Pareto efficient.
11
We prove Theorem 4.1 by building on a standard approach for finding an envy-free and Pareto
efficient allocation, namely solving the Eisenberg-Gale convex program (henceforth E-G program).
Recall that the E-G program with “budgets” e is the following.
max
n∑
i=1
ei log
m∑
j=1
vijxij , subject to
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1,∀j ∈ [m], and xij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
When ei = ej for all i, j, the outcome is also known as the competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes (CEEI), which is envy-free [26]. There exists a solution to the E-G program with primal
variables x and dual variables p (dual variable pj ≥ 0 corresponds to the first constraint above)
satisfying the following conditions.
∀j ∈ [m] : pj > 0 =⇒
∑n
i=1 xij = 1 (1)
∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] : vijpj ≤
∑m
k=1 vikxik
ei
(2)
∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] : xij > 0 =⇒ vijpj =
∑m
k=1 vikxik
ei
= maxk∈[m]
vik
pk
. (3)
These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a feasible solution to be optimal, and can
be derived from the KKT conditions; for completeness we show the derivation in Appendix E. The
standard interpretation is that ei is the budget of agent i and pj is the price for item j. Then, a
solution x,p consists of prices p and allocations x, such that each agent spends their entire budget
ei on “optimal” items and all items are completely sold. We say that an item j is “optimal” for
agent i given prices p, when it maximizes the ratio vij/pj, also known as the bang-per-buck.
For the remainder of this section, given a solution x,p, we use x and X indistinguishably for the
allocation, we write Xi for the allocation of agent i, and we say that item k is allocated to i, k ∈ Xi,
if xik > 0. We assume without loss of generality that for any solution, x,p, we have ∀j : pj > 0.
This holds as long as each item has at least one agent who values it; if this is not the case we can
safely drop those items. We prove the following, which immediately implies Theorem 4.16.
Theorem 4.2. There exist budgets e and an optimal solution (x = X,p) to the E-G convex program
with budgets e, such that X is clique identical strongly envy-free.
We start with the optimal solution X to the E-G convex program with identical budgets ei = 1 for
all i. Then, at a high level, we break the algorithm into two procedures that jointly alter x,p and e
such that x,p remains an optimal solution to the convex program with budgets e, while preserving
envy-freeness, until X satisfies the desired properties. Specifically, the indifference graph I(X) will
end up being a disjoint set of cliques, such that agents in a clique have identical allocations.
Optimal Transfers
Given an allocation, let ri :=
vi(Ai)
ei
be the maximum bang-per-buck ratio of agent i. We say that
agent i is indifferent towards any item k for which vikpk = ri. We first give a useful property of
solutions x,p. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.2.
Lemma 4.3. Given a solution x,p of an E-G program with budgets e, for all agents i, j such that
ei = ej , vi(Xi) = vi(Xj) if and only if ∀k ∈ Xj : vikpk = ri.
6Pareto efficiency is implied since the objective function is monotone.
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Lemma 4.3 tells us that under equal budgets, if agent i is indifferent to agent j’s allocation,
then j’s items are maximum bang-per-buck items for i as well. This gives some intuition for our
approach. Assuming equal budgets, if we move items along indifference edges, we can avoid violating
the KKT conditions and the solution remains optimal. We formalize this idea in Lemma 4.5; first
we need the following definition. Given a solution (x = X,p) for budgets e, we consider a change
in allocation of items ∆, where ∆ik is the difference in the allocation of item k for agent i.
Definition 4.4 (Optimal transfer). A transfer of items ∆ is an optimal transfer if for all items k
(1)
∑
i∈[n]∆ik = 0, i.e. the total allocation of item k remains unchanged, (2) xik +∆ik ∈ [0, 1] for
all agents i, i.e. x+∆ is feasible, and (3) for all agents i such that ∆ik > 0,
vik
pk
= ri, i.e. if agent
i is given more of item k, then item k maximizes bang-per-buck for agent i.
The proof of the next lemma can be found in Appendix C.3.
Lemma 4.5. Let (x = X,p) be a solution for budgets e and ∆ be an optimal transfer. Let δ
represent the change in budget where δi =
∑
k∈G pk ·∆ik. Let X ′ = X +∆. Then (x′ = A′,p) is a
solution for budgets e′ = e+ δ.
Indifference Edge Elimination
For an allocation X and subset of agents S ⊆ N , we overload notation, and let XS refer to the
allocation for agents in S. A set of agents S have identical budgets under e if there exists some c
where for all i ∈ S, ei = c. Recall that for an allocation X, I(X) refers to the indifference graph,
a graph where we have a vertex for every agent and an edge from (the vertices corresponding to)
agent i to agent j if vi(Xi) = vi(Xj). In the remainder of this section we refer to agents and vertices
interchangeably. Also, recall that for a directed graph G = (V,E), a clique is a subset of vertices
S ⊆ V such that for all v ∈ S, u ∈ S, where u 6= v, there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E, and that a weakly
connected component (henceforth just component) S is a subset of the agents such that for each
pair of agents i, j ∈ S, there is either a path from i to j or a path from j to i, and S is a maximal
subgraph with this property.
Definition 4.6 (Clique acyclic graph). A directed graph G = (V,E) is clique acyclic if the vertices
can be partitioned into cliques C1, . . . , Ck, that is, Ci ⊆ V for all i, ∪ki=1Ci = V , and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅
for all i 6= j, and where for any cycle K in the graph, K only contains vertices from Ci for some i.
A crucial step towards producing a CISEF allocation will be to find an allocation X such that
I(X) is clique acyclic and envy-free, where agents in each clique have the same allocation.
Lemma 4.7. There exists an algorithm that takes as input a solution (x = X,p) for budgets e and
a component S with identical budgets, and finds a solution (x′ = X ′,p) for budgets e where I(X ′S)
is clique acyclic and agents in each clique have identical allocations without violating envy-freeness
or adding new indifference edges to I(X).
Take the allocation X and indifference graph I(XS). At a high level we attempt to apply one
of the following two operations; we only apply Operation 2 only if Operation 1 cannot be done.
• Operation 1: Eliminate every cycle that is not a clique.
• Operation 2: Partition the graph into cliques by merging cliques and “re-balancing” allocations.
We explain in detail how these operations work, and prove that they satisfy some basic prop-
erties. We proceed to show how to use them to prove the lemma.
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Operation 1. Without loss of generality, suppose we have a cycle K = (1, . . . , k), where edges
go from agent i to agent i + 1 (and indices wrap around). If there exists an i where there is no
edge from i − 1 to i + 1, we show how to eliminate at least one edge from the cycle, keep vi(Xi)
the same for all agents, and not create any new indifference edges.
To perform this operation notice that Lemma 4.3 implies that there exists an item ℓ ∈ Xi+1
that is not a bang-per-buck item for agent i − 1, i.e. vi−1,ℓpℓ < ri−1. We construct an optimal
transfer ∆, parameterized by a budget b, as follows. Agent i will take b worth of item ℓ (specifically
b/pℓ units) from agent i + 1. All other agents i
′ ∈ K, i′ 6= i, will take arbitrary items of total
worth b from i′ + 1. Crucially, for all of the transfers, since there is an (i′, i′ + 1) edge for all
i′ ∈ K, i.e. vi′(Xi′) = vi′(Xi′+1), Lemma 4.3 implies the items taken maximize bang-per-buck
for i′. Next, notice that we can find a b > 0 small enough that X + ∆ is a feasible allocation7.
Finally, our transfers preserve the total allocation of each item and thus, ∆ is an optimal transfer.
Each agent loses and gains b worth of items so there is no change in budget associated with ∆.
Therefore, Lemma 4.5 implies that (x′ = X ′,p) is a solution for budgets e. Thus for all agents i,
vi(Xi) = vi(X
′
i).
Next, observe that vi−1(X
′
i) < vi−1(Xi) since it decreases by b · ri−1 but increases by strictly
less than b · ri−1. Since vi−1(Xi−1) = vi−1(X ′i−1), this implies that the indifference edge from agent
i− 1 to agent i disappears. Finally, we want to ensure that we do not violate envy-freeness or add
new indifference edges. There are two cases. The first case is that i is indifferent to j in X: we only
modify allocations in S, and S is a component, so we only consider i ∈ S, j ∈ S. Because (x′,p) is
a solution for budgets e, and agents in S have identical budgets, agent i will still not envy j in X ′.
The second case is that i is not indifferent to j in X; we want to find a b > 0 small enough such
that i will not envy or be indifferent to j in X ′. We give such a b in Appendix C.4.
We can repeatedly use the above process to eliminate all non-clique cycles. We do this by
eliminating cycles in order of increasing size. Suppose that all cycles of size k form a clique. It
is then possible to ensure that for all cycles of size k + 1, the vertices form a clique. To see why,
consider an arbitrary cycle K of size k + 1. If there exists an i such that there is no edge from
agent i − 1 to agent i + 1, we can eliminate the cycle. Otherwise, for all i, there is an edge from
agent i− 1 to agent i+1. Then, we know that for all i, K \ {i} is a cycle of length k, and therefore
a clique of size k, implying the vertices of K form a clique of size k+1. Note that any cycle of size
2 immediately forms a clique. Therefore, if we repeatedly choose the smallest size non-clique cycle
and eliminate it, we will eventually eliminate all cycles that are not a clique.
Operation 2. We construct a set of cliques C1, . . . , Cs by starting with each vertex in its own
clique and arbitrarily merging cliques if the resulting set of vertices still forms a clique. Suppose
we merge to get a clique C = {1, . . . , ℓ}. Lemma 4.3 implies that every agent i ∈ C is indifferent
to any item z ∈ XC , XC = X1 + . . . +Xℓ, such that vizpz = ri. Thus, we can perform the following
re-balance operation to form X ′: for each agent i ∈ C, set X ′i = 1|C|XC , and for all other agents
i /∈ C, X ′i = Xi.
First, note that this is an optimal transfer, by definition. We want to show that we do not
violate envy-freeness or add new indifference edges. We separate into cases based on whether
agents i, j are in C. If both agents are in C, nothing changes. If i ∈ C, j /∈ C, since vi(Xi) stays
the same, nothing changes. If i /∈ C, j ∈ C, if i was indifferent to all agents in C, nothing changes.
Otherwise, i is not indifferent to some agent in C, in which case after the re-balance, i will lose
their indifference edge towards all agents in C.
7Letting eS be the budget of agents in S, we can choose any b ≤ min(eS, xi+1,l · pl) = xi+1,l · pl (i.e we just need
to ensure agent i does not take more than xi+1,l of item l).
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Proof of Lemma 4.7. We start by applying Operation 1, which eliminates every cycle that is not
a clique. Now, notice that eliminating all non-clique cycles does not imply that we can partition
the graph into cliques in a way that is clique acyclic. To see this most clearly, consider a 5 vertex
instance, where vertices 1, 2, 3 form a clique, and so do vertices 3, 4, 5. All cycles are also cliques,
but the graph is still not clique acyclic (the most “tempting” partition has the issue that cycle
(1, 2, 3) contains a vertex that belongs to two cliques). This is where Operation 2 comes in.
Once we have eliminated all non-clique cycles, if we are not in a clique acyclic graph with the
desired properties, we apply Operation 2. It is possible that during the execution of Operation
2, an indifference edge will be eliminated. In this case, we stop with Operation 2 and go back to
applying Operation 1, and so on. Eventually, this process terminates: neither operation creates any
new edges, and furthermore, each time we loop we eliminate at least one edge. The two operations
preserve the property that (x′ = X ′,p) is a solution for budgets e, and that X ′ is envy-free, without
adding new indifference edges. In addition, re-balancing in Operation 2 ensures that agents in each
clique have identical allocations. It remains to show that I(X ′) is clique acyclic.
Assume for sake of contradiction that there exists a cycle that includes vertices in two different
cliques C1, C2. Therefore there exists some edge from C1 to C2 and an edge from C2 to C1. Due
to the fact that agents in a clique have identical allocations, this implies that there exists agents
i1 ∈ C1, i2 ∈ C2 such that i1 has edges to all of C2 and i2 has edges to all of C1. Thus, we can
construct a cycle, and thus a clique, containing all agents in C1 ∪C2. Then, C1 ∪C2 form a clique,
contradicting the fact that no more mergers were possible by Operation 2.
Once we have an allocation with the properties of Lemma 4.7, it remains to eliminate the edges
between cliques, while preserving the property that agents in a clique have the same allocation.
Lemma 4.8. There exists an algorithm that takes as input an allocation X and component S with
identical budgets such that I(XS) is clique acyclic (with at least one non-clique edge) and agents in
each clique have identical allocations, and finds a set of agent budgets e′ and solution (x′ = X ′,p)
for budgets e′, where I(X ′S) consists of k > 2 components S1, S2, · · · , Sk, each component consists
of agents with identical budgets, I(X ′S) has strictly fewer edges than I(XS), and the new allocation
does not violate envy-freeness or add new indifference edges.
Proof. For I(XS), we view each clique as a vertex. Consider the graph G, where each vertex is
a clique Ci (of I(XS)), and there is an edge between Ci and Cj if there exists a vi ∈ Ci, vj ∈ Cj
where (vi, vj) is an edge in I(XS). Observe that G forms a DAG, and let Cs be a source vertex in
G and let Sk = {C1, . . . , Cl} be the sink vertices reachable from Cs. We know a source and sink
vertex exists because we assume there is at least one non-clique edge.
Now we return to I(XS). We will create item transfers ∆. We find it intuitive to describe ∆
via a flow in the following graph. Starting from G, create a new global source vertex s, and add all
(s, v) edges for all v ∈ Cs. Create a new global sink vertex t, and add a (v, t) edge for all v ∈ Sk.
Finally, we let each edge in the graph have infinite capacity. Next, we find a flow of size b from s
to t, with the additional constraints that the flow from s to each v ∈ Cs is the same, and for each
C ∈ Sk, the flow from each v ∈ C to t is the same. We show how to construct such a flow, starting
from an arbitrary flow of size b. Let fij be the flow along edge (i, j). For the source clique, Cs,
we can update f ′si =
1
|Cs|
∑
i∈Cs
fsi so that f
′ now satisfies the equal flow constraint for the source
clique. Then, we can always ensure the flow f ′ is balanced by updating the flow between vertices
in Cs: For each i, j ∈ Cs, i < j, set f ′ij = fij + 1|Cs| (fsj − fsi), where negative flows are added as
positive flows in the reverse direction. The flow along all other edges remains the same. To show
that f ′ is a feasible flow, we show flows are balanced for vertices in the source clique. Observe for
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an agent i ∈ Cs:∑
j∈N∪{s}
f ′ji−
∑
j∈N
f ′ij =
∑
j∈N
fji+
1
|Cs|
∑
j∈Cs
fsj+
1
|Cs|
∑
j∈Cs
(fsi − fsj)−
∑
j∈N
fij =
∑
j∈N∪{s}
fji−
∑
j∈N
fij.
Therefore, if f is a valid flow, so is f ′. An analogous procedure can be applied to the sink cliques.
We use this flow to guide the item transfers, ∆. For each edge with flow, agent i will take
an arbitrary fij worth of items from agent j. The global sink and source vertices are, obviously,
excluded. We choose b small enough such that X + ∆ is feasible. We can assume without loss
of generality that the sum of flows towards any vertex is at most b, as any extra flow must be
part of a cycle and can be eliminated. Then if eS is the budget of agents in S, we can choose any
b ≤ eS . Since we ensure the total allocation of an item is preserved and we only transfer items
along indifference edges between agents of the same budget, ∆ is an optimal transfer. Therefore
we can apply Lemma 4.5.
Since there are no item transfers to s, each agent v ∈ Cs with an incoming flow has the
same increased budget. Similarly, for each sink clique C with a positive flow from v ∈ C to t,
each member of C will have the same decreased budget. Now, if we take each component in the
resulting indifference graph, we claim that each agent in the component will have identical budgets.
It is sufficient to show that if e′i 6= e′j , then there will not be an edge from vi to vj . Since initially
everyone in S had the same budget, and item transfers — as well as “budgets” — go from sinks to
sources, if e′i < e
′
j , there was never an edge from vi to vj to begin with. Now suppose e
′
i > e
′
j ; we
have:
vi(Xi) =
∑
k∈Xi
vikxik =
KKT (3)
∑
k∈Xi
ripkxik = rie
′
i > rie
′
j =
∑
k∈Xj
ripkxjk ≥
∑
k∈Xj
vikxjk = vi(Xj),
which implies no (i, j) indifference edge. Since agents in Cs have a greater budget than all other
remaining agents, there will be at least two components. The final property that we need to prove
is that the new allocation does not violate envy-freeness or add new indifference edges. We break
into cases. First, if agents i and j were indifferent, as we only modify allocations in component
S, we only consider when i ∈ S, j ∈ S. We ensure vi(Xi) either stays the same or increases, since
we transfer items in the opposite direction of indifference edges. For similar reasons, vi(Xj) either
stays the same or decreases. On the other hand, if agent i did not envy j we can set b small enough
such that i will not envy j in X ′. We discuss this final detail in Appendix C.4.
Putting everything together
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Our overall algorithm first solves the E-G convex program with budgets e
where ei = 1 for all i, to find a solution (x = X,p). We keep track of the set of components S
with identical budgets, where initially S = {N}. We alternate between applying the algorithm of
Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8, henceforth procedure 1 and procedure 2. We start by applying the
former to each S ∈ S. It is possible that after applying procedure 1, edges are eliminated, resulting
in S being split into multiple components. Let f(S) be the set of components formed and update
S := ⋃S∈S f(S). The “clique acylic” and “identical allocations” properties are still satisfied by
each individual component in S. We then apply procedure 2 to each S ∈ S. We perform the
same update to S, where f(S) is the set of components with identical budgets found after applying
procedure 2. We repeat until applying the two procedures does not decrease the number of edges
in the graph. Finally, we perform the re-balance operation (described in procedure 1) on each
component.
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Both procedures do not add edges and reduce the number of edges. There are at most n2 − n
initial edges, and thus the algorithm terminates. In addition, both procedures produce allocations
and budgets where (x′ = A′,p) is a solution to the E-G program for budgets e′. Finally, X is
CISEF. First, X is envy-free by construction. Next, consider the final graph I(X). We claim
that each component is a clique where agents have identical budgets. The component must be
clique-acyclic after procedure 1 is applied. No edges were removed by procedure 2, so there could
not have been any edges between cliques. Therefore, the component can only consist of one clique.
Next, procedure 2 guarantees that each agent in the clique has the same budget. Lemma 4.3 tells
us that agents will have identical valuations, up to a multiplicative factor, for items that any agent
in the clique receives. The final re-balance operation doesn’t alter any of the above properties.
5 When Fairness and Efficiency are Incompatible
In this section we discuss the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness against the latter two, stronger
adversaries. Our main conclusion is, informally, that no allocation algorithm with vanishing envy
Pareto dominates random allocation. Benade` et al. [5] show that against an adaptive adversary
(and thus against all weaker adversaries), random allocation has vanishing envy. Allocating at
random is also 1/n-Pareto efficient ex-ante. Here, we show that no algorithm can achieve vanishing
envy and expected ( 1n + ε)-Pareto efficient for any ε > 0, even against the non-adaptive adversary.
Theorem 5.1. For any ε > 0, no randomized allocation algorithm can achieve both expected envy
f(T ), where f(T ) ∈ o(T ), and ( 1n + ε)-Pareto efficient ex-ante against a non-adaptive adversary.
Proof. To build up intuition, we first describe the lower bound for the case of an adaptive adver-
sary. Since against an adaptive adversary randomization does not help, we focus on deterministic
algorithms. Consider any vanishing envy algorithm that for all T produces an allocation AT , where
ENVY(AT ) ≤ f(T ) for some f(T ) ∈ o(T ), and assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this
algorithm achieves ( 1n + ε)-Pareto efficiency for some ε > 0.
Consider the following instance I, parameterized by ε and T . For each agent i, items j from
T
n (i−1) to Tn i will have value 1, and all other items j′ have value ε. For all intermediate allocations
at time t ≤ T , we must have ENVY(At) ≤ f(T ) since an adaptive adversary can make the remaining
items valueless to all agents. We start by showing via induction that for all “segments” of items
T
n (i − 1) to Tn i, each agent must receive a number of items in [ Tn2 − xi, Tn2 + xi], where xi =
f(T )
ε
(
1 + 2ε
)i−1
.
For i = 1, i.e. the first segment, suppose that some agent k receives Tn2 + y items where y > 0.
Another agent kˆ must then receive fewer than T
n2
items. Then, the envy of kˆ for k at the end
of the first segment, ENVYkˆ,k(A
T/n) is at least ε · y. But, ENVYkˆ,k(AT/n) ≤ f(T ), which implies
that y ≤ f(T )ε ; the lower bound on y is identical. For the inductive step, again suppose that in the
segment Tn (i − 1) to Tn i some agent k receives Tn2 + y items, where y > 0, and let kˆ be the agent
who received fewer than T
n2
items. At the start of the segment, to agent kˆ, the difference in value
between agent k’s bundle and their bundle is at least −2∑i′<i xi′ , which is if kˆ got Tn2 +xi′ in each
segment, k got T
n2
− xi′ , and kˆ had value 1 for all items up until Tn (i − 1). Thus, after the i-th
segment, ENVYkˆ,k(A
T
n
i) ≥ ε · y + vkˆ
(
A
T
n
(i−1)
k
)
− vkˆ
(
A
T
n
(i−1)
kˆ
)
≥ ε · y − 2∑i′<i xi′ , which in turn
implies that
y ≤ 1ε
(
f(T ) + 2
∑
i′<i xi′
)
= 1ε
(
f(T ) + 2
∑
i′<i
f(T )
ε
(
1 + 2ε
)i′−1)
= f(T )ε
(
1 + 2ε
)i−1
.
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The last equality is obtained by summing the geometric series and simplifying. The bound for y is
identical when we consider the case that y < 0. Next, we show that this implies the allocation AT
is not ( 1n + ε)-Pareto efficient. First, note that the social welfare maximizing allocation achieves
utility (Tn , . . . ,
T
n ), by giving all the items of the i-th segment to agent i. Meanwhile, since xi < xn,
we have that in AT each agent gets utility ui at most (1 + (n− 1)ε)( Tn2 + xn). Therefore,
ui
1/n + ε
< (1 + (n− 1)ε)
(
T
n2
+ xn
)(
1
1
n + ε
)
= (1 + (n− 1)ε)
(
T
n2
+
f(T )
ε
(1 +
2
ε
)n−1
)
n
1 + εn
=
1 + (n− 1)ε
1 + εn
·
(
T
n
+ n
f(T )
ε
(1 +
2
ε
)n−1
)
=
T
n
· 1 + (n− 1)ε
1 + εn
·
(
1 +
n2
ε
f(T )
T
(1 +
2
ε
)n−1
)
.
Picking T large enough so that f(T )T <
ε
1+(n−1)ε · εn2(1+2/ε)n−1 gives ui < Tn · (1/n+ε) for every agent
i. Therefore, AT is not ( 1n + ε)-Pareto efficient, a contradiction. This concludes the proof for an
adaptive adversary. We can use the above result to prove the same for a non-adaptive adversary;
details are relegated to Appendix C.5.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper we study whether fairness and efficiency can be balanced in an online setting under
a spectrum of different adversary models. We show tight upper and lower bounds for each setting.
For the adaptive adversary, and therefore for all the other, weaker ones as well, the upper bound is
given by [5]: an algorithm with vanishing envy that gets a 1/n approximation of Pareto. We show
that this result is essentially tight (Theorem 5.1) for the non-adaptive adversary (and therefore
for all the stronger ones) if one wants to balance fairness and efficiency. Our main upper bound
(Theorem 3.6) is for correlated agents and i.i.d. items and shows how to get Pareto efficiency ex-post
and guarantee EF1 ex-post, or envy-freeness with high probability. We argue (Appendix B) that
one cannot hope for a better fairness guarantee even for identical agents, and since the efficiency
guarantee is the strongest one, we conclude that this result is also tight. Finally, even though our
main upper bound of course holds for identical agents, for this case we show (Proposition 3.1) how
to adapt the approach of Dickerson et al. [11] and Kurokawa et al. [19] and get the same tight
result, but with a simpler algorithm.
Computation Considerations. Given our structural result, Theorem 4.1, it is clear that all
our results run in polynomial time. To get our structural result we assume an exact solution to
the E-G program, that we can get in strongly polynomial time via the results of Orlin [24]. Our
edge-elimination processes only runs O(n2) times. The only possible issue is the number of bits in
the solution (x,p) and budgets e, as the item transfers described in Lemma 4.7 and 4.8 can both
increase the length (in bits) of x and e. This increase depends primarily on the budget transfers b
(computed in Appendix C.4). We can always choose b such that b is equal to (vi(Ai)− vi(Aj))/4c
for some i, j, where c is a constant that only depends on the instance and the initial solution to the
E-G program. Since vi(Ai), vi(Aj) are linear functions of x, their representations are a constant
(depending on the vij and n) larger than the elements of x. In addition, the representation of b is
an additive constant larger than the bit length of the min difference vi(Ai)− vi(Aj), so performing
the transfer of items under budget b will also only increase the bit length of the elements of x,e by
a constant.
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Future directions. Notice that, with the exception of the non-adaptive adversary, we completely
understand what is possible if we want to optimize only fairness or only efficiency. On the other
hand, for the non-adaptive adversary, it remains open how well one can do with respect to min-
imizing the maximum (expected) pairwise envy. Vanishing envy is of course achievable, but we
do not know if it’s possible to improve the O˜(
√
T ) guarantee, or how big that improvement could
be; for instance, we don’t even know of a super constant lower bound. Another technical question
that remains open is what is possible when the distributions chosen by the adversary can depend
on T . Finally, a general direction for future work is balancing fairness and efficiency under dif-
ferent adversaries (for example, one could imagine adversaries weaker than the non-adaptive one,
but stronger than correlated agents with i.i.d. items), or under different definitions of “fair” and
“efficient”.
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A Different Budgets and Prices are Necessary
Consider the instance with 3 agents and 2 items. Agent A has value 1 for both items. Agent B has
values 1/2 and 1 for the first and second item, respectively, while agent C has values 1 and 1/2.
It is easy to check that the unique solution that maximizes the product of agents’ utilities (i.e.
equal budgets in the EG convex program) gives agent A 1/3 of each item, while agent B gets 2/3
of item 2 and agent C gets 2/3 of item 1. The prices of both items are equal.
In this example, the unique product maximizing solution does not satisfy the CISEF property,
as there are two indifference edges from A to B and A to C. Therefore, to get an allocation like the
one guaranteed by Theorem 4.1 one needs to go beyond equal budgets in the E-G convex program.
B Improving on “EF1 or EF w.h.p.” Guarantee is Impossible
We show these impossibility results under the weakest adversary, where the adversary can give a
distribution DV and item values vit are drawn from D
V .
First, we show that it is not always possible to guarantee envy-freeness with high probability.
Define DV to be the uniform distribution over the set {1}. Note that whenever T is not a multiple
of n, the allocation will not be envy-free. Next, we show that for any x, envy-freeness up to x
goods, is not an achievable guarantee. We use the construction of the lower bound in Benade` et al.
[5], which assumes item values bounded within [0, 1].
Lemma B.1 (Benade` et al. [5]). For n ≥ 2 and r < 1, there exists an adversary strategy for setting
item values such that any algorithm must have ENVY(A) ∈ Ω((T/n)r/2), where A is the allocation
T items.
In the proof of Lemma B.1, they use an adversary strategy where all agents other than the first
two agents do not value the item. The value of the arriving item to the first two agents depends
solely on a state machine, where the states are “. . . , L2, L1, 0, R1, R2, . . .”. The item associated
with state Li has value (1, νi) (so a1 values it at 1 and a2 values it at νi), the item associated with
state 0 has value (1, 1), and the item associated with state Ri has value (νi, 1). The state machine
starts at state 0 and transitions one step left or right after each item arrival, depending on how the
previous item was allocated. Thus, the set of all possible item values used for a length T instance
is {0, 1, ν1, . . . , νT }. They define νi = (i+ 1)r − ir.
We now apply Lemma B.1, setting r = 12 . Let c, T0 to be the constants such that for any T ≥ T0,
the adversary can guarantee ENVY(A) ≥ c(T/n)r/2 = c(T/n)1/4. We then take any T ′ ≥ T0 where
c(T ′/n)1/4 > x and set D to be the uniform distribution over {0, 1, ν1, . . . , νT ′}.
We claim that for any T ≥ T ′, there is a positive probability that the allocation will not be
envy-free up to x goods. First, for the given algorithm, there is a positive probability that the
first T items drawn will follow the adversary strategy. Then, for the remaining items, there is a
positive probability that all the items will have no value to any agent. Thus, for the final allocation
A, we will have ENVY(A) > x. Finally, observe that when item values are bounded within [0, 1],
ENVY(A) > x implies that A is not envy-free up to x goods.
C Missing Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Allocating to the agent with the highest value clearly generates a Pareto
efficient allocation as it maximizes social welfare. The algorithm first handles the special case where
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D is a point mass. In this case vit = v for all i and all t, therefore allocating the arriving items in
a round-robin manner achieves an EF1 allocation, as each agent will have at most one fewer item
than other agents.
In the remaining cases, we apply Theorem 3.2. The statement and proof of Theorem 3.2
assume that the distribution is non-atomic, which ensures that argmaxk∈N vkt is exactly one
agent and makes the utilitarian allocation algorithm well defined. In contrast, our setting assumes
atomic distributions. However, the theorem can be easily adapted to our setting by adding ran-
dom tie-breaking to the utilitarian allocation algorithm as described in Algorithm 1. We then
rewrite Theorem 3.2, replacing [argmaxk∈N vkt = {j}] with [j receives t] and similarly with
[argmaxk∈N vkt = {i}]. This modified theorem can be shown using essentially the same proof
as the original.
We now show that the distribution satisfies the two properties. The first property to show is
that that for each agent i ∈ N , Pr[i receives t] = 1/n. This property is satisfied by symmetry,
as all agent values are drawn from the same distribution and tie-breaking is done randomly. The
second property is that for some constant ∆ > 0, and for all agents i, j ∈ N where i 6= j:
E[vit | i receives t]−E[vit | j receives t] ≥ ∆. We largely follow the proof of Lemma 3.2 by Kurokawa
et al. [19] with some simplifications and importantly, handling the case when the distribution D is
discrete.
Since agents’ value distributions are identical, we can restate this as:
E[vit | i receives t]−E[vit | i does not receive t] ≥ ∆
Agents are all identical and the algorithm always allocates the item to an agent with the
maximum value for it. This implies that E[vit | i receives t] = E[max(v1t, . . . , vnt)]. Next, ifD is not
a point mass, we know that Var[D] > 0. From here, we can show that E[max(v1t, . . . , vnt)] > E[vit].
Let Var[D] = c. Let X¯ = E[X], p = Pr[X < X¯]. Observe that when Var[D] > 0, p ∈ (0, 1).
c = Var[D]
= E[(X − X¯)2]
≤ E[|X − X¯ |]
= pE[X¯ −X | X < X¯] + (1− p)E[X − X¯ | X ≥ X¯]
= −pE[X | X < X¯] + (1− p)E[X | X ≥ X¯] + (2p − 1)X¯
From here, we do case-analysis based on p ≤ 1/2 or p > 1/2.
Suppose that p > 1/2, we use the substitution X¯ = pE[X | X < X¯] + (1 − p)E[X | X ≥ X¯ ]
and then we rewrite the above as:
c ≤ 2p(X¯ −E[X | X < X¯ ])
=⇒ c
2
≤ X¯ −E[X | X < X¯] ≤ E[X | X ≥ X¯ ]−E[X | X < X¯]
Similarly, we p ≤ 1/2, we go in the other direction and get:
c ≤ 2(1 − p)(E[X | X ≥ X¯]− X¯)
=⇒ c
2
≤ E[X | X ≥ X¯]− X¯ ≤ E[X | X ≥ X¯ ]−E[X | X < X¯]
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Finally, we have that:
E[max(v1t, . . . , vnt)] ≥ (1− pn)E[X | X ≥ X¯] + pnE[X | X < X¯ ]
≥ (1− p)E[X | X ≥ X¯] + pE[X | X < X¯ ]
+ (p− pn)(E[X | X ≥ X¯ ]−E[X | X < X¯])
≥ (1− p)E[X | X ≥ X¯] + pE[X | X < X¯ ] + (p − pn) c
2
= E[vit] + (p− pn) c
2
Thus, we have that E[vit | i receives t] ≥ E[vit] + (p− pn) c2 . From law of total expectation, we
know that E[vit] =
1
n E[vit | i receives t] + n−1n E[vit | i does not receive t]. We can combine and
rearrange to also show that E[vit | i does not receive t] ≤ E[vit] − (p − pn) c2(n−1) , which allows us
to conclude:
E[vit | i receives t]−E[vit | i does not receive t] ≥ (p− pn) c
2(n− 1) + (p − p
n)
c
2
Setting ∆ to (p− pn) c2(n−1) + (p− pn) c2 , which is positive since p ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0, completes
the proof.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
We can rewrite KKT condition (3) as: for all i ∈ [n], for all k ∈ Xi, pj = vik·ei∑
k′∈Xi
vik′xik′
= vikri .
Then, for every agent i we have
∑
k∈Xi
pkxik =
∑
k∈Xi
vik ·ei∑
k′∈Xi
vik′xik′
xik = ei
For the “only if” direction, we know for all items k ∈ Xj , vik = ripk. We can substitute this
into our previous equation to get:
vi(Xi) =
∑
k∈Xi
vikxik =
∑
k∈Xi
ripkxik = riei = riej =
∑
k∈Xj
ripkxjk =
∑
k∈Xj
vikxjk = vi(Xj).
For the “if” direction, assume that there is an item k∗ ∈ Xj such that vik∗pk∗ 6= ri. KKT
condition (3) implies that k∗’s bang-per-buck is at most ri, so we must have vik∗ < ripk∗. Combined,
we get:
vi(Xi) =
∑
k∈Xi
vikxik =
∑
k∈Xi
ripkxik = riei = riej =
∑
k∈Xj
ripkxjk >
∑
k∈Xj
vikxjk = vi(Xj).
C.3 Proof of Lemma 4.5
(x,p,e) must satisfy the KKT conditions. p does not change and x′ is feasible by definition;
it remains to show that (x′,p,e′) satisfies the KKT conditions. Condition (1) is satisfied since∑
i∈[n]∆ik = 0 for all items k. Furthermore, notice that ∆ik 6= 0 implies that vikpk = ri: if ∆ik > 0
this fact is implied by the definition of an optimal transfer, while if ∆ik < 0, for x+∆ to be feasible,
it must be that xik > 0, so
vik
pk
= ri is implied by condition (3). Thus:∑m
k=1 vikx
′
ik
e′i
=
∑m
k=1 vikxik +
∑m
k=1 vik∆ik
ei + δi
=
∑m
k=1 vikxik +
∑m
k=1 ripk∆ik
ei + δi
=
∑m
k=1 vikxik + riδi
ei + δi
,
which is equal to
∑m
k=1 vikxik
ei
, since ri = vi(Xi)/ei. Therefore, the RHS of condition (2) does not
change (the LHS of course didn’t change since it only has values and prices), so condition (2) is still
24
satisfied. When xik > 0, condition (3) is satisfied by similar reasoning. Finally, it is possible that
xik = 0 but x
′
ik > 0. In this case, we know that ∆ik > 0, and therefore
vik
pk
= ri =
∑m
k=1 vikxik
ei
, by
the definition of an optimal transfer and the definition of rj. Thus, condition (3) is satisfied.
C.4 Choosing b
Operation 1. We first discuss how to choose b in Operation 1 from Lemma 4.7.
For any pair (i, j), we are concerned about vi(Ai) − vi(Aj). Operation 1 guarantees that
vi(Xi) = vi(X
′
i), so vi(Ai)− vi(Aj) can change only when j ∈ K. Define c = maxi∈N ,k∈[m] vikpk : the
maximum bang-per-buck for any agent. Then, we choose b such that:
b < min
{
vi(Ai)− vi(Aj)
c
: i ∈ N , j ∈ K, vi(Ai)− vi(Aj) > 0
}
Observe that a budget constraint of b ensures that vi(Aj) will change by at most b · c <
vi(Ai)− vi(Aj).
Lemma 4.8. Next, we discuss how to choose b in the procedure described in Lemma 4.8.
We use a similar approach. Unlike before, vi(Ai) − vi(Aj) can change when either i ∈ S or
j ∈ S, as vi(Ai) changes for some i ∈ S. Setting
b < min
{
vi(Ai)− vi(Aj)
2c
: i, j ∈ N , i ∈ S ∨ j ∈ S, vi(Ai)− vi(Aj) > 0
}
as the budget constraint is sufficient as it ensures that vi(Ai) and vi(Aj) can each change by at
most
vi(Ai)−vi(Aj)
2 .
C.5 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (continued) . Suppose that there is an allocation algorithm which guarantees
that for all T , no matter the instance the adversary selects, E[ENVY(AT )] ≤ f(T ) for some f(T ) ∈
o(T ), where the expectation is over the randomness used by the algorithm. We first describe
a family of n instances. For i = 1 to n, instance Ii’s first
T
n i items follow I, the instance of the
adaptive adversary described above, and the remaining items have no value. Let g(T ) be a function
such that g(T ) · f(T ) ∈ o(T ) and g(T ) ∈ ω(1)8.
Again, we bound the number of items the algorithm can allocate to each agent in each segment;
this time our bounds will be looser and probabalistic. Consider the behavior of the algorithm when
faced with instance I1. At the end of the first segment, i.e. for items 1 through
T
n , if the algorithm
allocates to some agent k at least T
n2
+ x1, for x1 > 0, with probability at least
1
g(T ) , then the
expected envy of some agent kˆ (the one who received fewer than Tn2 items) is at least ε · x1, that
is E[ENVY(AT )] ≥ 1g(T ) · εx1. Since E[ENVY(AT )] ≤ f(T ), we have that x1 ≤ g(T )f(T )ε . In other
words, with probability 1− 1g(T ) , each agent receives a number of items within [ Tn2 − x1, Tn2 + x1].
Note that because the first Tn items are identical for all instances, this holds for instances I2, . . . , In.
Similarly, we consider the behavior of the algorithm faced with I2 and look at the end of the
second segment. Suppose that conditioned on the algorithm having allocated each agent a number
of items within [ T
n2
− x1, Tn2 + x1] after the first segment, with (conditional) probability at least
1
g(T )−1 , some agent k receives at least
T
n2 + x2 items from the second segment. This translates
8One can think of g(T ) = T δ, for some small δ > 0 that depends on f(T ).
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to an unconditioned probability of occuring of at least 1g(T ) and for similar reasons as before, we
must have that x2 ≤ g(T )f(T )ε + 2x1ε ≤ g(T )f(T )ε
(
1 + 2ε
)
. Together, we know that with probability
1−
(
1
g(T ) +
1
g(T )−1
(
1− 1g(T )
))
= 1− 2g(T ) , each agent receives a number of items within [ Tn2−x2, Tn2+
x2]. We continue this for larger i, for xi =
g(T )f(T )
ε
(
1 + 2ε
)i−1
. Finally, we analyze efficiency of the
algorithm for instance In. Each agent receives utility at most (1 + (n − 1)ε))( Tn2 + xn) + ng(T )T ,
where the additional ng(T )T term accounts for the worst case allocation assuming a deviation.
ui
1/n+ ε
<
T
n
· 1 + (n− 1)ε
1 + εn
·
(
1 +
n2
ε
f(T )g(T )
T
(1 +
2
ε
)n−1 + n3g(T )
)
.
By picking T large enough9 the adversary can make sure that the expected utility for every
agent i is upper bounded by Tn · (1/n + ε) . On the other hand, the single allocation that gives
items from Tn (i− 1) to Tn i to agent i yields utility ui = Tn .
D Strong Envy-Free and Pareto Optimality are not Achievable
Here, we give an instance where strong envy-freeness and Pareto optimality are not achievable even
though agents valuations are not identical up to a multiplicative factor.
Item t g1 g2 g3
Value of gt to Agent 1 1 1 1
Value of gt to Agent 2 0.5 1 1
Value of gt to Agent 3 0.25 1 1
Table 2: Instance with three agents
In Table 2, none of the three agents are identical. However, we claim that in any envy-free
and Pareto optimal allocation, agents 2 and 3 will be indifferent towards each other’s allocation.
Intuitively, the problem is that agents 2 and 3 have identical valuations over the items they could
possibly receive in an envy-free and Pareto efficient allocation, items 2 and 3.
Let X be any Pareto efficient and envy-free allocation. Since it is envy-free and agent 1 is
indifferent between the items, we must X11 +X12 +X13 ≥ 1.
Next, we show that if X is Pareto efficient, then X11 = 1. If X11 < 1, then either X12 > 0 or
X13 > 0. In addition, either X21 > 0 or X31 > 0. Without loss of generality, suppose X12 > 0
and X21 > 0. Then letting c = min(X21,X12) we give the following allocation X
′ which Pareto
dominates X so X is not Pareto efficient.
X ′ = X +

 c −c 0−c c 0
0 0 0


Therefore, we know X11 = 1 and as a result, X21 = X31 = 0. Finally, because agents 2 and 3
have identical valuations for items 2 and 3, we have X22 +X23 ≥ 1 and X32 +X33 ≥ 1. Together,
9Ensuring g(T )f(T )
T
< 1
2
ǫ
1+(n−1)ε
· ε
n2(1+2/ε)n−1
and g(T ) < ε
2n3
will suffice.
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this implies that X22 + X23 = X32 + X33 = 1 so agents 2 and 3 will be indifferent towards each
other’s allocations.
E Deriving KKT Conditions
Here, we derive the KKT conditions in order to show that they are both necessary and sufficient
conditions for optimal solutions to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program.
We first introduce dual variables p,k for the first and second inequality constraints. From
stationarity, we have:
∇x
n∑
i=1
ei log
m∑
j=1
vijxij =
m∑
j=1
pj∇x
n∑
i=1
xij − 1 +
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
−kij∇xxij
For each i, j, we can take the gradient with respect to xij to get:
ei
vij∑m
j=1 vijxij
= pj − kij
vij
pj
=
∑m
j=1 vijxij
ei
(
1− kij
pj
)
(4)
The primal and dual feasibility conditions tell us that:
−xij ≤ 0,
n∑
i=1
xij − 1 ≤ 0, pj ≥ 0, kij ≥ 0
Finally, complementary slackness tells us that:
xij > 0 =⇒ kij = 0 and kij > 0 =⇒ xij = 0 (5)
pj > 0 =⇒
n∑
i=1
xij = 1 and
n∑
i=1
xij < 1 =⇒ pj = 0 (6)
KKT condition 1 follows from Equation 6. Meanwhile, we show that KKT conditions 2 and 3
are equivalent to the stationarity condition plus the first two complementary slackness conditions.
Proposition E.1. For any x,p where pj > 0, KKT conditions 2 and 3 hold if and only if there
exists k such that Equations 4 and 5 hold.
Proof. Consider any x,p.
We first show the forwards direction. We assume that KKT conditions 2 and 3 hold and give
a k such that Equations 4 and 5 hold. Take any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. We set the value of kij depending
on whether xij > 0. Suppose that xij > 0. Then observe that setting kij = 0 will satisfy both
the stationarity and complementary slackness conditions. Otherwise, xij = 0. In this case, the
slackness conditions trivially hold and we just need to show that there exists a kij ≥ 0 such that
Equation 4 holds. From KKT condition 2, we have:
vij
pj
/
∑m
j=1 vijxij
ei
≤ 1
Letting c =
vij
pj
/
∑m
j=1 vijxij
ei
, we solve for kij which gives kij = pj(1− c), which is non-negative.
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Next, we show the reverse direction. Assume that there exists k such that Equations 4 and 5
hold. For any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], because we have that pj > 0 and kij ≥ 0, this implies that 1− kijpj ≤ 1.
Combine this with Equation 4 and we get exactly KKT condition 2.
Next, we show that KKT condition 3 holds. Assume that xij > 0. Equation 5 tells us that
kij = 0. Therefore, 1− kijpj = 1 and applying Equation 4 tells us that
vij
pj
=
∑m
j=1 vijxij
ei
.
F Improving Guarantee for Independent Agents
When the adversary is limited to distributions where agents’ valuations are independent, under the
mild assumption that the distributions Di are not point masses, we give an ex-post Pareto efficient
allocation algorithm that guarantees envy-freeness with high probability. That is, it is possible to
improve the “or EF1” part of the guarantee of Theorem 3.6 when agents are independent and the
distributions are not point masses.
Our approach builds on our structural result (Theorem 4.1) obtained for correlated agents,
which transforms the online problem into one of finding a fractional allocation for divisible items.
For independent agents, we can find a fractional allocation that is strongly envy-free and Pareto
optimal. Under this stronger guarantee, the proof of Theorem 3.6 gives that when the graph is
strongly envy-free, using Algorithm 3 guarantees envy-freeness with high probability.
F.1 Strong envy-freeness example
At first, it seems plausible that with independent agents and distributions that are not point
masses, any solution to the E-G convex program will be strongly envy-free and Pareto optimal.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. In this section, we give an example where there exists a fractional
allocation that is both Pareto optimal and strongly envy-free. However, we show that this solution
can be missed when choosing an arbitrary solution to the E-G convex program, or even by using
the algorithm for finding CISEF and Pareto optimal solutions. We show how the E-G solution can
be transformed into a strongly envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation, highlighting the key ideas
behind our algorithm.
Consider the following fractional allocation problem for three agents. The agents’ value distri-
butions are as follows: For both X ∼ D1 and X ∼ D2, we have Pr[X = 0] = 110 ,Pr[X = 1] = 910 .
For X ∼ D3, we have Pr[X = 1] = 1617 ,Pr[X = 2] = 117 .
Recall that in the fractional allocation problem, we treat each item type γj as a divisible item.
Each agent i has a value function v′i, where v
′
i(γj) = vi(γj) · fD(γj). We now present a solution x,p
to the E-G convex program with identical budgets of 1, shown in Table 3.
x,p are constructed such that each agent spends their entire budget of 1 on their items. p has
the property that all items are bang-per-buck items for agent 3. Agent 3 has maximum bang-per-
buck items γ5, γ7 while agent 2 has MBB items γ3, γ7. The allocation x satisfies the maximum
bang-per-buck constraints. Therefore, x,p is a solution.
The envy-graph for x still contains four edges: (1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2). Now consider what
happens if we apply the algorithm for finding a CISEF and Pareto optimal solution. Procedure 2,
as described in Lemma 4.8, increases the budget of agent 3 and gives agent 3 more of γ7. Concretely,
we might increase the budget of agent 3 by 16600 and decrease the budget of agents 1 and 2 by
8
600 ,
resulting in a new solution (x′ = X ′,p′) where p′ = p and the only differences between x′ and x
are that x′17 = x
′
27 =
74
162 and x
′
37 =
14
162 . The resulting envy-graph is now CISEF but not strongly
envy-free, as it contains two edges: (1, 2), (2, 1).
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Item type γj v1t v2t v3t fD(γj) v
′
1t v
′
2t v
′
3t x1t x2t x3t pt
γ1 0 0 1
16
1700 0 0
16
1700 0 0 1
16
600
γ2 0 0 2
1
1700 0 0
2
1700 0 0 1
2
600
γ3 0 1 1
144
1700 0
144
1700
144
1700 0 0 1
144
600
γ4 0 1 2
9
1700 0
9
1700
18
1700 0 0 1
18
600
γ5 1 0 1
144
1700
144
1700 0
144
1700 0 0 1
144
600
γ6 1 0 2
9
1700
9
1700 0
18
1700 0 0 1
18
600
γ7 1 1 1
1296
1700
1296
1700
1296
1700
1296
1700
75
162
75
162
12
162
1296
600
γ8 1 1 2
81
1700
81
1700
81
1700
162
1700 0 0 1
162
600
Table 3: Fractional allocation problem. All items with positive value to an agent are also MBB
items for that agent. The MBB ratio for agents 1 and 2 is 317 and for agent 3 is
6
17 .
In this example, it is fairly easy to see how to remove the remaining two envy edges and maintain
Pareto optimality. Suppose we transfer ∆ worth of γ7 from agent 1 to 3 and ∆ worth of γ5 from
agent 3 to 1. We do a similar transfer for agents 2 and 3 with items γ7 and γ3. As agent 1 does
not value γ3 and agent 2 does not value γ5, performing these two changes will remove the two envy
edges. If we choose ∆ small enough, no new envy edges are created.
F.2 Strong Envy-freeness and Pareto Optimality
The above approach can be generalized into an algorithm for finding a strongly envy-free and
Pareto optimal allocation. For each distribution Di, let Si be the support of Di. The independent
agent adversary can be simulated by the correlated agent adversary by expanding out the individual
distributions into a distribution for item types D with supportGD where GD = S1×S2×· · ·×Sn. In
this section, we will use two notations, γj and (a1, . . . , an), interchangeably to refer to an item type.
As described in the Pareto optimal clique rounding algorithm, we define a new valuation function
v′i for each agent i: v
′
i((a1, . . . , an)) = vi((a1, . . . , an))fD((a1, . . . , an)) = ai · fD((a1, . . . , an)).
Theorem F.1. Given an instance with items GD = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn, where for all i, |Si| ≥ 2,
and n agents with valuation functions v′i((a1, . . . , an)) = ai ·fD((a1, . . . , an)), there always exists an
allocation that is strongly envy-free and Pareto efficient.
Applying Theorem 4.1, we start with a solution (x = X,p) to budgets e where X is CISEF and
Pareto optimal. Now suppose in I(X) there exists a cliqueK with size k. Without loss of generality,
suppose that these are the first k agents. For agents i ∈ K, let hi = maxSi and li = minSi. These
are agent i’s highest and lowest values for items prior to scaling by the probability of the item.
Since |Si| ≥ 2, hi > li.
For any (a1, a2, . . . , ak) ∈ S1 × S2 . . . × Sk, we denote the subset of items with those values
with G(a1,a2,...,ak) = {(b1, b2, . . . , bn) : b1 = a1, b2 = a2, . . . , bk = ak, (b1, b2, . . . , bn) ∈ GD}. In
particular, we care about the subsets of items involving the high and low values for each agent.
Let H = (h1, . . . , hk) and for each i ∈ K, let H i = (l1, . . . , li−1, hi, li+1, . . . lk). The corresponding
subsets with those values are GH and GHi .
For a γj = (a1, . . . , an), we denote to the item’s value to the remaining agents as R(γj) =
(ak+1, . . . , an). In particular, we are interested in the items in GH and GHi with values R(γj). De-
fine (H i, R(γj)) = (l1, . . . , li−1, hi, li+1, . . . lk, ak+1, . . . , an) and (H,R(γj)) = (h1, . . . , hk, ak+1, . . . , an).
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Now consider the allocation of the agents in K. From the CISEF property, they all have the
same allocation, denoted as XK . We first show the following two claims:
Lemma F.2. There exists an item γj ∈ GH ∩XK .
Lemma F.3. For all items γj ∈ XK , γj /∈ GH1 ∪GH2 ∪ · · · ∪GHk .
Proof of Lemma F.2. We first show that for any γj and Pareto optimal X, if γj ∈ XK , then
(H,R(γj)) ∈ XK . Assume for sake of contradiction that γj ∈ XK but (H,R(γj)) /∈ XK . Let
γj′ = (H,R(γj)) and let agent i be any agent not in K where γj′ ∈ Xi. From KKT condition (3),
item j′ must maximize agent i’s bang-per-buck, meaning:
vij · fD(γj)
pj
=
v′ij
pj
≤ v
′
ij′
pj′
=
vij′ · fD(γj′)
pj′
However, because vij = vij′ , this implies that
fD(γj )
pj
≤ fD(γj′ )pj′ . Meanwhile, item j maximizes
agent 1’s bang-per-buck so:
h1 · fD(γj′)
pj′
=
v1j′ · fD(γj′)
pj′
=
v′1j′
pj′
≤ v
′
1j
pj
=
v1j · fD(γj)
pj
<
h1 · fD(γj)
pj
This implies that
fD(γj′ )
pj′
<
fD(γj)
pj
, contradicting the previous inequality. We know XK is non-
empty, as otherwise the allocation X would not be envy-free. Thus, there exists some γj ∈ XK .
This implies that (H,R(γj)) ∈ XK and also by definition, (H,R(γj)) ∈ GH .
Proof of Lemma F.3. From Lemma F.2, there exists a γj ∈ GH ∩XK . Now consider an arbitrary
γj′ ∈ GHi for some i ∈ K. As shown earlier in the proof of Lemma F.2, if vij′ = vij and γj is an
MBB item for agent i, then
fD(γj′ )
pj′
≤ fD(γj)pj .
However, for all other agents i′ ∈ K, i′ 6= i:
v′i′j′
pj′
=
vi′j′ · fD(γ′j)
pj′
≤ vi′j′ · fD(γj)
pj
<
hi′ · fD(γj)
pj
=
v′i′j
pj
In other words, item j′ is not a maximum bang-per-buck item for i′. As agents in K have the
same allocation XK , this means that γj /∈ XK .
Now, we introduce a third procedure to the indifference edge elimination algorithm:
Procedure 3. Take a clique in the indifference graph and choose an item γj ∈ GH ∩XK , which
exists by Lemma F.2. We construct X ′ by performing k transfers. For each i ∈ K, by Lemma F.3,
there must exist some agent i′ /∈ K where (H i, R(γj)) ∈ Xi′ . We define an item transfer ∆i as:
transfer δi worth of (H i, R(γj)) from agent i
′ to agent i, and δi worth of γj from i to i
′.
This transfer has the property that both γj and (H
i, R(γj)) are MBB items for agent i and i
′,
but (H i, R(γj)) is not an MBB item for all other agents i
∗ ∈ K, i∗ 6= i. To show these properties,
letting γj′ = (H
i, R(γj)), we already know that γj is an MBB item for agent i and γj′ is an MBB
item for agent i′. Because vij = vij′ and vi′j = vi′j′ , we can show that
fD(γj′ )
pj′
≤ fD(γj)pj and also
fD(γj′ )
pj′
≥ fD(γj)pj , implying that
fD(γj′ )
pj′
=
fD(γj)
pj
. Using this equality, we show:
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v′ij
pj
=
vij · fD(γj)
pj
=
vij′ · fD(γj′)
pj′
=
v′ij′
pj′
Thus, items j and j′ both maximize bang-per-buck for agent i. We can show the same for agent
i′. Meanwhile, for agent i∗, the same equality shows γj′ = (H
i, R(γj)) is not an MBB item:
v′i∗j′
pj′
=
vi∗j′ · fD(γj′)
pj′
<
vi∗j · fD(γj)
pj
=
v′i∗j
pj
The only remaining condition for ∆ =
∑
i∆
i to be an optimal transfer is to set the δi small
enough that X +∆ is feasible.
Next, for any two agents i, j ∈ K, we want to show that this transfer eliminates the edge (i, j).
X ′ = X +
∑
i∆
i. Transfer ∆i will eliminate the edge (j, i) for all j ∈ K, j 6= i since agent i now
owns an item that is not an MBB item for agent j. Finally, to ensure no new indifference edges or
envy-freeness violations are created, we set δi = bk , where b is chosen using the method discussed
in Appendix C.4. The extra 1k factor ensures that we can perform all k transfers safely.
One issue is that X ′ might not be CISEF. Consider when the recipient in ∆i, agent i′, is part
of clique K ′ with |K ′| > 1. In this case, we change Xi′ without changing the allocation for other
agents in K ′. To handle this case, let XK ′ be the allocation for agents in K
′. Any transfer of items
to and from the agent can instead be spread out across all agents in the clique. Specifically, the
final allocation is X∗, where X∗K ′ = XK ′ +
1
|K ′|(X
′
i′ −Xi′) for the relevant i′,K ′ and the same as
X ′ otherwise. This allocation can be shown to be CISEF and Pareto optimal.
Proof of Theorem F.1. From Theorem 4.1, we start with a solution (x = X,p) to budgets e where
X is CISEF and Pareto optimal. Starting from allocation X, we repeat procedure 3 while the
indifference graph still contains cliques (of size greater than 1). Each time we perform procedure
3, we eliminate one clique without creating new indifference edges (or envy violations). Since
procedure 3 describes an optimal transfer, the resulting allocation is still Pareto optimal. Once we
eliminate all cliques of size greater than 1, the resulting indifference graph only contains cliques of
size 1 and thus, the allocation is strongly envy-free and Pareto optimal.
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